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Abstract: STorage as a Service (STaaS) cloud platforms benefits such as getting access 
to data anywhere, anytime, on a wide range of devices made them very popular among 
businesses and individuals. As such forensics investigators are increasingly facing cases 
that involve investigation of STaaS platforms. Therefore, it is essential for cyber 
investigators to know how to collect, preserve, and analyse evidences of these platforms. 
In this paper, we describe investigation of three STaaS platforms namely SpiderOak, 
JustCloud, and pCloud on Windows 8.1 and iOS 8.1.1 devices. Moreover, possible 
changes on uploaded and downloaded files metadata on these platforms would be tracked 
and their forensics value would be investigated. 
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1.   Introduction 
Cloud computing enables businesses and individual to access computing resources such 
as servers and storages on an on-demand basis, where resources can be quickly 
provisioned with minimal efforts and interaction with the service provider (Mell & 
Grance, 2011).  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) broadly 
categorised cloud computing services into three categories: 
1. Software as a Service (SaaS): When an application is used to access shared 
infrastructure of the Cloud Storage Service Provider (CSSP). A popular 
example of SaaS is Storage-as-a-Service (STaaS) cloud systems.   
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS): Users may deploy their own applications on the 
CSSP's infrastructure 
3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The CSSP provides the underlying computing 
resources for the deployment of software (including Operation System (OS)) by 
the users (Mell & Grance, 2011).  
The increasing popularity of STaaS and the potential for such services to be 
criminally exploited have attracted the attention of policing and forensics scholars in 
recent years (Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & bin Shamsuddin, 2012). Many 
emerging and new platforms are now based on cloud services to operate. As noted by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2014), cloud forensics is the 
application of scientific rules, technological exercises and approved methods to rebuild 
past events of crime committed in the cloud computing environment.  
A number of researchers have reported data collection and preservation (A 
Aminnezhad, Dehghantanha, Abdullah, & Damshenas, 2013; Damshenas, 
Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Shamsuddin, 2014; F Daryabar & Dehghantanha, 2014; 
Hogben & Dekker, 2012; Hooper, Martini, & Choo, 2013; D Quick, Martini, & Choo, 
2014), cloud malware detection (Damshenas, Dehghantanha, & Mahmoud, 2013; Farid 
Daryabar & Ali Dehghantanha, 2011) analysis and even privacy (Asou Aminnezhad & 
Ali Dehghantanha, 2012; Farid Daryabar, Dehghantanha, Udzir, & Fazlida, 2013; 
Dehghantanha & Franke, 2014) as main challenges during investigation of cloud 
platforms. As explained by Martini and Choo (2014a), "the large number of open 
challenges presented in a report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(2014) demonstrates that, at the time of the research, cloud forensics remains an 
unresolved and somewhat under researched area of enquiry". 
Although a number of STaaS have been examined (see Table 1), researchers 
(K.-K. R. Choo & Smith, 2008; K.-K. R. Choo, 2008) have posited that organized crime 
and cyber criminals are innovative and will constantly seek to “innovate” in order to 
evade the scrutiny and reach of law enforcement, such as using other STaaS to store 
incriminating evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: A snapshot of existing cloud forensics research (Adapted from Martini and 
Choo (2012)) 
Model Public cloud Private cloud 
SaaS 
(including 
STaaS) 
Amazon S3, Dropbox, Evernote and 
Google Docs (Chung, Park, Lee, & 
Kang, 2012) 
Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft 
SkyDrive (Federici, 2014) 
Dropbox, Box, and SugarSync (Grispos, 
Glisson, & Storer, 2013) 
Amazon Cloud Drive (Hale, 2013) 
Dropbox, OneDrive, and ownCloud 
(Martini, Do, & Choo, n.d.)  
Google Document, Flicker, PicasaWeb 
(Marturana, Me, & Tacconi, 2012) 
iCloud (Oestreicher, 2014) 
Google Drive (Darren Quick & Choo, 
2014) 
Dropbox (Darren Quick & Choo, 2013b) 
SkyDrive (Darren Quick & Choo, 2013a) 
Google Drive, Dropbox, and SkyDrive 
(Darren Quick & Choo, 2013c) 
UbuntuOne (M Shariati, Dehghantanha, 
Martini, & Choo, n.d.; Mohammad 
Shariati, Dehghantanha, Martini, & 
Choo, 2015)  
hubiC (Blakeley, Cooney, 
Dehghantanha, & Aspin, 2015) 
SugarSync (Mohammad Shariati, 
Dehghantanha, & Choo, 2016) 
Mega (F. Daryabar, A. Dehghantanha & 
R. Choo, 2016) 
OneDrive, Box, GoogleDrive and 
Dropbox (F.Daryabar; A. Dehghantanha; 
B. Eterovic-Soric & R. Choo, 2016) 
Dropbox, Box, and SugarSync (Grispos et 
al., 2013) 
ownCloud (Martini & Choo, 2013) 
IaaS  Hadoop (Cho, Chin, & Chung, 2012) 
Amazon EC2 (Dykstra & Sherman, 2012) 
vCloud (Martini & Choo, 2014c) 
XtreemFS (Martini & Choo, 2014b) 
Eucalyptus (Zafarullah, Anwar, & Anwar, 
2011) 
 
In this research, we study three popular STaaS that have not been examined in 
the literature, namely: SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud.  
Users of SpiderOak, JustCloud and pCloud may download, upload, and access 
their data using web-browser and client application (e.g. mobile app). The SpiderOak 
client application also enables users to create, schedule, and restore backups and share 
files via password-protected links. In addition, the Hive feature of the SpiderOak client 
application allows contents to be synced across all devices linked to the user’s account. 
SpiderOak Zero-knowledge service reportedly encrypts all data stored on their servers. 
Such a service would be attractive to cybercriminals and individual users who want to 
  
ensure that their stored data will not be surrendered to law enforcement agencies by the 
cloud service provider. 
JustCloud allows users to synchronize, create backup, and share files. In file 
synchronization, a folder is created on the user's desktop after JustCloud's client 
application is installed, which enables the user to access data stored on all devices 
where the client application has been installed. 
Users may store, sync, and share their files using pCloud. A unique feature of 
this CSSP is the upload link. User can have files uploaded on their space by those who 
have access to the upload link. This CSSP is also capable of making backup from other 
services including Dropbox, Facebook, Instagram, and Picasa. Table 2 briefly compares 
the features of aforementioned services. 
 
Table 2: CSSPs Comparison Table 
  SpiderOak JustCloud pCloud 
Operating 
Systems 
Support 
Windows Y Y Y 
Linux Y Y Y 
Mac OSX Y Y Y 
iOS Y Y Y 
Windows 
Phone 
N Y N 
Android Y Y Y 
BlackBerry N Y N 
Storage (by free) 2GB 15MB
1
 20GB 
Maximum paid storage 100GB Not 
Limited 
1TB 
Backup Y Y N 
Sync Y Y Y 
Encryption Y Y Y 
Sharing Y Y Y 
 
In this paper, we answer the following questions: 
(1) What artifacts of forensic interest can be recovered from the Random Access 
Memory (RAM) and the Hard Disk (HDD) of a Windows device after using 
SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud services via Internet Explorer (IE), Firefox 
(Fx), and Google Chrome (GC) browsers? 
(2) What artifacts of forensic interest can be recovered from the RAM and HDD of 
a Windows device after using SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud services via 
the respective client Windows applications? 
(3) What artifacts of forensic interest can be recovered from the internal memory 
and internal storage of an iPhone device after using SpiderOak, JustCloud, and 
pCloud services via the respective iOS applications? 
(4) Whether the contents or the metadata of the investigated files change during the 
process of uploading and downloading, and whether the timestamp information 
of the downloaded files is reliable?  
                                                 
1
 JustCloud free trial expires after 14 days.  
  
Research will be conducted on Windows 8.1 and iOS devices. At the time of 
research, Windows 8.1 is the latest version of Microsoft desktop OS and iOS is one of 
the most popular mobile platforms (Net Applications, 2014a, 2014b). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the 
forensic framework used to guide the research and the experiment setup. The findings 
from the analysis of SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud are presented in sections 3, 4, 
and 5 respectively. Finally, the last section concludes this paper. 
 
2.   Research methodology 
2.1 Cloud forensic framework 
When conducting a forensic investigation, the investigator should adopt best practices 
such as those of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The ACPO specifies 
four principles for collecting and examining digital evidence (Williams, 2012): 
 Principle 1: Data which may subsequently be relied upon in a court of law 
should not be changed. 
 Principle 2: In the event that a person needs to access the original data, that 
person must be suitably qualified and is able to justify and explain the 
implications of the actions. 
 Principle 3: An appropriate auditing and record-keeping processes should be in 
place which would ensure that an independent third party would be able to 
examine the recorded processes and achieve the same result. 
 Principle 4: The investigating officer needs to ensure that the law and these 
principles are adhered to. 
It is also common practice that a forensic framework be used to guide the 
investigation. In the context of our paper, we adopt the cloud forensic framework 
introduced by Martini and Choo (Martini & Choo, 2012). This is, perhaps, the first 
digital forensic framework designed to conduct both client and server investigations 
of cloud services. The framework has also been validated by the authors using 
ownCloud (Martini & Choo, 2013),  (Martini & Choo, 2014b), (Martini & Choo, 
2014c), and by Thethi and Keane (2014) on EC2 cloud. There are four stages in this 
framework, namely: evidence source identification and preservation, collection, 
examination and analysis, and reporting and presentation for collecting digital 
evidence from the cloud environment. 
1. Evidence Source Identification, Collection and Preservation. In this phase, 
potential sources of relevant data are identified. Any device capable of 
connecting to STaaS, either via a browser or a client application, is considered a 
potential source of evidence. In this phase, the investigator should also ensure 
that ACPO principles are adhered to, wherever possible. During collection of 
evidence from storage media, particularly media belonging to external parties, 
the investigator should also ensure that relevant laws and regulations are 
followed (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006).  
In this research, the .vmem and vmdk files of each virtual machine (VM) were 
collected with extension E0 using AccessData FTK Imager. The former was 
cloned while the VM was running, whereas the latter was duplicated after the 
  
VM was shut down. The logs of Wireshark, recording communications between 
VMs and the respective STaaS were also acquired at this stage. The MD5 hash 
checksum of collected evidence files were documented. 
2. Examination and analysis. Information from acquired data is extracted in this 
phase. Methods to circumvent or bypass protection mechanism on the devices 
may be used to examine and analyze information collected and preserved from 
the previous phase (e.g. use of tools to brute-force password-protected data). 
During this phase, findings should also be reviewed with information or 
intelligence drawn from other sources and investigations (e.g. see metadata 
analysis described in Sections 3 to 5; and (D Quick & Choo, 2014) before  a 
conclusion is drawn.  
3. Presentation. In the last phase, findings are documented for presentation in a 
court of law (Kent et al., 2006).  
2.2 Experiment setup 
2.2.1 Windows 
The Windows-based experiments were implemented on VMs using VMware Player 
6.0.1. The following files with forensic value were collected and examined: 
 .vmem file: A paging file that includes the backup of the VM’s main memory 
(VMware Inc., n.d.). 
 .vmdk file: A virtual disk file that stores the contents of the VM’s hard disk 
drive (VMware Inc., n.d.). 
Windows 8.1 Build 9600 along with IE 11.0.9600.16384, Fx 33.0.2, and GC 
38.0.2125.111 m were installed on a VM with 25 GB hard disk and 1 GB memory. In 
this research, 14 files from a dd image file developed by Carrier (2004) were used as the 
dataset (see Table 3). The original dd image file was mounted on the VM using 
OSFMount 1.5. 
Table 3. Files used in the Windows-based experiment 
Name MD5 Note 
file1.jpg 75b8d00568815a36c3809b46fc84ba6d A JPEG file with JPEG extension 
file2.dat de5d83153339931371719f4e5c924eba A JPEG file with non-JPEG extension 
file3.jpg 1ba4e91591f0541eda255ee26f7533bc A non-image file with JPEG extension 
file4.jpg c8de721102617158e8492121bdad3711 A non-image file with JPEG header 
file5.rtf 86f14fc525648c39d878829f288c0543 A file with 0xffd8 signature value in multiple locations of the file. 
file8.zip d41b56e0a9f84eb2825e73c24cedd963 A ZIP file with ZIP extension containing a JPEG file named file8.jpg. 
file8.jpg f9956284a89156ef6967b49eced9d1b1 A JPEG file inside of the ZIP file 
file9.boo 73c3029066aee9416a5aeb98a5c55321 A ZIP file with non-ZIP extension containing a JPEG file 
named file9.jpg 
file9.jpg c5a6917669c77d20f30ecb39d389eb7d A JPEG file inside the ZIP file 
file10.tar.gz d4f8cf643141f0c2911c539750e18ef2 A gzipped tar file containing a JPEG file named file10.jpg 
file10.jpg c476a66ccdc2796b4f6f8e27273dd788 A JPEG file inside the gzipped tar file 
file11.dat f407ab92da959c7ab03292cfe596a99d A JPEG file with dat extension. 
file12.doc 61c0b55639e52d1ce82aba834ada2bab A Word document with a JPEG file inside it 
file13.dll:here 9b787e63e3b64562730c5aecaab1e1f8 A JPEG file within an alternate data streams (ADS) 
From the base VM, the following snapshots were created: 
 VM-W1: A SpiderOak account was created using IE. 
  
 VM-W2: A SpiderOak account was created on Fx.  
 VM-W3: A SpiderOak account was created using GC. 
 VM-W4: A JustCloud account was created using IE. 
 VM-W5: A JustCloud account was created on Fx. 
 VM-W6: A JustCloud account was created using GC. 
 VM-W7: A pCloud account was created on IE. 
 VM-W8: A pCloud account was created on Fx in this VM.  
 VM-W9: A pCloud account was created using GC. 
 VM-W10: The SpiderOak's client application was installed. Sample files were 
also uploaded and downloaded using the client application. 
 VM-W11: The JustCloud's client application was installed, and a series of 
uploading and downloading of sample files using the client application was 
undertaken. 
 VM-W12: The pCloud's client application was installed. 
 VM-W16: A series of downloading of sample files using SpiderOak with IE. 
 VM-W17: Sample file were downloaded using SpiderOak via Fx. 
 VM-W18: A series of downloading of sample files using SpiderOak with GC. 
 VM-W19: A series of downloading of sample files using JustCloud with IE. 
 VM-W20: A series of downloading of sample files using JustCloud with Fx. 
 VM-W21: A series of downloading of sample files using JustCloud with GC. 
 VM-W22: A series of downloading of sample files using pCloud with IE. 
 VM-W23: A series of downloading of sample file using pCloud with Fx. 
 VM-W24: A series of downloading of sample files using pCloud with GC. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Windows-based Experiments 
Each of the STaaS accounts created was linked to a specific email address created for 
this research (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Research email accounts 
Email Address First Name Last Name 
csforensics_1@yahoo.com Johnny Appleseed 
csforensics_2@ yahoo.com Mary Major 
csforensics_3@ yahoo.com Richard Miles 
  
SpiderOak 5.1.8, JustCloud 1.4.0.28, and pCloud 1.3.2 were respectively installed on 
VM-W10, VM-W11, and VM-W12 and sample files were uploaded and downloaded 
using the respective client applications. 
VM-W10, VM-W11, and VM-W12 were shut down and cloned respectively to 
VM-W13, VM-W14, and VM-W15. They were used for the investigation of data 
remnants after uninstallation of the client applications. On the last nine VMs (i.e. VM-
W15 to VM-W24), the sample files were uploaded and downloaded using the respective 
browsers. On VM-W10, VM-W-11 and VM-W16 to VM-W24, MD5 checksum of the 
downloaded files were recorded and compared with the original ones.  
In all our experiments, we configured the browsers and client applications to 
decline storing the passwords. In additional, prior to cloning each .vmem file, the 
corresponding browser was closed without the user signing out. The base VM was 
configured to create only one .vmdk file, and other VMs were generated by taking 
snapshots of the base .vmdk file. VMware Virtual Disk Manager Utility was used to 
merge the base .vmdk file with the snapshot files in order to make creating of the image 
file using FTK Imager possible. 
2.2.2 iOS 
 
In the iOS-based experiments, SpiderOak 3.1.1, JustCloud 1.3.11, and pCloud 
1.11.15 apps were installed on an iPhone 5S device with iOS 8.1.1. 
The following files were collected for further analysis on a personal computer 
(PC): 
 Memory (.vmem file) 
 Network logs collected by Wireshark (.PCAP files) 
 Browsers' files 
o IE: %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache, 
%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\, and 
%LocalAppData%\Packages\windows_ie_ac_001\ 
o Fx: %LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\ 
and %AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\ 
o GC: %LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default 
 Master File Table (MFT) with $MFT file name and located in %SystemDrive% 
 NTFS log ($LogFile) located in %SystemDrive% 
 Prefetch folder located in %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\ 
 Registry 
 Paging file with pagefile.sys filename in %SystemDrive% 
 Swap file named swapfile.sys in %SystemDrive% 
 Windows events located in %SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs\ 
 Link files 
 Thumbcache files located in %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\ 
 Unallocated space 
The above collected files were analysed using following tools: 
 Wireshark 1.12.1 was used to filter network traffic to detect IPs and ports used 
by the respective STaaS web-portal and client application. 
  
 Autopsy Version 3.1.1 was used to conduct keyword search within E0 files 
linked to VMs' HDDs, and analyze browser cookies, browser histories and 
filtered files of E0 images. 
 ESEDatabaseView v1.23 was used to analyse tables located in IE database. 
More specifically, for IE versions 10 and 11, the browser database is stored in an 
Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) file named WebCacheV01.dat (Malmström & 
Teveldal, 2013). The tables to be examined are contained in the ESE file located 
in %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\.  
 SQLite Manger was used to extract sqlite files of Fx and GC. 
 DCode Date (Wilson, n.d.) was used for converting dates and times from hex, 
epoch, and WebKit formats to human readable format. 
 Thumbcache Viewer 1.0.2.7 was used to extract thumbcache files. 
 FTK Imager was used to analyze other files of interest. 
 iExplorer was used for mounting and browsing iPhone backups.  
Files from each of the E0 files that containing matching keywords were 
identified and filtered for further analysis – see Table 5. 
Table 5. Keyword search items 
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Account email addresses Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Account names2 Y Y N/A Y Y N/A Y Y N/A Y Y N/A Y 
Accounts ID3 Y N/A N/A Y NA NA Y N/A N/A Y N/A N/A Y 
Account passwords Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
CSSP names Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Client applications' 
filenames 
N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Sample file names N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Shared URLs N N N Y N/A N Y N/A N Y N Y N 
Share ID/Name N N/A N/A Y N/A Y Y N/A Y Y N/A Y N 
RoomKey Y N/A N/A Y N/A N/A Y N/A N/A Y N/A N/A N 
Shared files N N N Y N/A N Y Y N Y Y N N 
Shared URL password N N N Y N/A N/A Y N/A N/A Y N/A N/A N 
Invitation message N/A N/A N N/A N/A Y N/A N/A Y N/A Y Y N 
Synchronization name N N N N Y N/A N Y N/A Y Y N/A N 
Downloading path N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N/A 
Devices' names N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Integrity check N N N Y Y N/A N N N Y Y Y Y 
The iPhone backups were also searched for user email address, name, IDs, and 
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 pCloud registration process does not ask for the name of the account. 
3
 Accounts of JustCloud and pCloud do not have ID. 
  
password. 
3   Findings: SpiderOak  
3.1   Observations: SpiderOak's account created using the respective browsers 
 
We were able to recover various information associated with the creation of the 
SpiderOak's account using the respective browsers – see Tables 6 to 8. 
 
Table 6: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the SpiderOak's account 
using IE 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffic IP address 173.223.11.89 on port 80 
38.121.104.79 and 38.121.104.80 on port 443 
Memory Word “spideroak”, the email address, the ID, and the name of 
the created account 
Browser related files The URL of SpiderOak  visited during the creating of the 
account, in addition to the corresponding timestamp 
information of creation and access 
Registry URL of browsed webpages in 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\TypedURLs 
The Timestamp information in 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\TypedURLsTime. 
Paging “spideroak.com” word  
 
Table 7: Collected artefacts with regard to the creation of the SpiderOak's account using 
Fx 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffic IP addresses 38.121.104.79 and 38.121.104.80 on port 443 
Memory The "spideroak" word, email address, ID, and name of the 
created account 
Browser related  
files 
The email address used in signing up process (see Figure 2) 
The date and the UTC time of visiting 
Unallocated space The email address, the ID and the full name of the registered 
account (see Figure 3) 
Other files SpiderOak's website was observed in a file located in 
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the SpiderOak's account 
using GC 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffic 38.121.104.79 and 38.121.104.80 on port 443 
Memory "spideroak" word, the email address, the ID, the name, and the 
password of the created account (see Figure 4) 
Browser related 
files 
Information about visited spideroak.com with the date and the 
UTC time of the last visit and "spideroak.com" word, the email 
address, the full name, and the ID of the created account 
Unallocated space The email address of the created account 
Other files SpiderOak's website was seen in a file in 
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations 
 
 
Figure 2. The email address of the created account 
 
 
Figure 3. The email address, the ID, and the full name of the created account 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Recovered password of the created account 
3.2   Observations: SpiderOak's Application Program 
Network traffics. Communications between the VM and SpiderOak's servers were made 
with IP addresses 38.121.104.79, 38.121.104.89, and 38.121.104.90 on port 443. 
Memory. SpiderOak, the username, the email address, and the password of the created 
the account along with the share ID (with the date and the time of creation), the shared 
URL and its password, the name of the shared folder, the name of the downloaded files, 
the name of the created sync and its folder on the host and on the target device, all were 
obtained from the collected vmem file (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 5. The username and the email address of SpiderOak's account 
 
  
 
Figure 6. The password of the created shared URL in VM-W10's vmem file 
Client application files. Client information such as the username, the share ID, 
RoomKey, the name of the shared folder, the name of the downloaded files, the name of 
the created sync and its folder on the host and on the target device as well as the date 
and the time of launched backup and synchronization were seen in 
%AppData%\SpiderOak\spider_###############.log. In the log file, an IP address 
was found which was appeared to be used for broadcasting on ports 21327 and 21328. 
The three first octal were the same as the device's IP address. In the 
oak_###############.log, similar events regarding the application along with the date 
and the time of occurrence were found. In %AppData%\SpiderOak\config.txt, the Hive 
path was observed. Files in %AppData%\SpiderOak\Sync contained the details of 
created syncs including the date and the time of their processing and source and 
destination paths, all, in SQLite format. 
MFT. The sync name, the downloading folder name, and the installation filename were 
identified in the MFT$. 
Registry. Installation filename and its storing path were found in the following keys: 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store 
Moreover, SpiderOak's client application created inbound rules on both TCP and 
UDP protocols in Windows Firewall. The related keys' paths are as follow: 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\
Parameters\FirewallPolicy\FirewallRules] 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAcc
ess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\FirewallRules] 
Prefetch. Installation filename was observed in Prefetch folder. 
Paging file. The installation filename and the name of the downloaded files and their 
storing path were located in pagefile.sys. 
Windows events.  In the Application node, some records linked to the client application 
installation were located. 
  
Link files. Two lnk files related to SpiderOak were located in 
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\SpiderOak\. 
Thumbcache. A thumbnail of file1.jpg was located in the Thumbcache folder. 
Unallocated space. The name of the downloaded files, the installation filename, and 
spideroak.exe string were located in the unallocated space. 
Other files. We located some information concerning the downloading folder and the 
name of the downloaded files in 
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\GatherLogs\SystemIn
dex\SystemIndex.2.gthr and 
%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-
C647E37CA0D9}.1.ver0x0000000000000004.db, the Windows Indexing System and 
Windows File Caching respectively. The downloading folder name was also observed 
in NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1, located in %UserProfile%, and the installation 
filename was observed in %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve and 
%SystemRoot%\System32\config\SOFTWARE.LOG2. Also in 
%AppData%\SpiderOak\fs_queue.db, synchronized files with the date and the UTC 
time were identified.  
Spideroak.exe was observed in the following files: 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SYSTEM and SYSTEM.LOG1  
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\ 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\WdiContextLog.etl.002 
 %SystemRoot%\Temp\AA9B36AA-758C-4EB0-94A6-
C5AB9F4CEC2A\CompatProvider.dll 
 %LocalAppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\appsFolder.itemdata-ms.bak 
 %LocalAppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\appsFolder.itemdata-ms 
 %LocalAppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\TileCacheLogo-
1736031_100.dat 
 %LocalAppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches/{3DA71D5A-20CC-
432F-A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000b.db 
 %UserProfile%\ntuser.dat.LOG2 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.LOG1 
 %SystemRoot%\Installer\24c05.msi 
Based on the collected MD5 checksums, apart from file13.dll, the contents of 
other sample files were preserved by the CSSP. We were not able to restore ADS from 
file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc such as Authors value remained the same as the 
original file. It was also evident that the Modified value of downloaded files did not 
alter. However, we observed that the values of Created and Accessed fields were 
changed to the date and the time of downloading (see Figure 7). 
 
  
 
Figure 7. General tab of file1.jpg after being downloaded by SpiderOak's client 
application 
3.3  Observations: Uninstalling SpiderOak's Application Program 
Memory. Although the uninstall wizard asked for restart, restarting did not occur. Aside 
from the password of the shared URL, the result of memory analysis is similar to that 
reported in Section 3.2 (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Account's password in memory of VM-W13 
Client application files. After uninstalling SpiderOak on VM-W13, we observed that the 
Hive folder and its contents remained. We were also able to locate the files located in 
%AppData%\SpiderOak\ previously discussed in Section 3.2. 
MFT and paging file. Both MFT and paging file contained spideroak word, the sync 
name, and downloading folder name. 
NTFS log. "spideroak.exe" was observed in $LogFile. 
Registry. The following keys pointed to spideroak.exe after uninstalling: 
  [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\*\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\SpiderOak] 
 [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Directory\background\shellex\ContextMenuHandler
s\SpiderOak] 
  
 [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Directory\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\SpiderOak
] 
 [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache] 
 [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache] 
 [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] 
 [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UFH
\SHC] 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\*\shellex\ContextMenuHan
dlers\SpiderOak] 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\Directory\background\shell
ex\ContextMenuHandlers\SpiderOak] 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\Directory\shellex\Context
MenuHandlers\SpiderOak] 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\
Parameters\FirewallPolicy\FirewallRules] 
 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAcc
ess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\FirewallRules] 
 [HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache] 
 [HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] 
 [HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UFH\SHC] 
 [HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache] 
Prefetch folder. "spideroak.exe" was observed in AgRobust.db, Layout.ini, Trace2.fx, 
RUNDLL32.EXE-125D4518.pf, RUNDLL32.EXE-F61C91E8.pf, and 
SPIDEROAK.EXE-CA2F0025.pf. 
Windows events. In the Application node, Microsoft-Windows-Diagnostics-
Performance%4Operational.evtx, Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational.evtx, 
and Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security%4Firewall.evtx, 
we located records indicating the uninstalling of the client application. In addition, 
spideroak.exe was observed in WdiContextLog.etl.001, WdiContextLog.etl.002, and 
WdiContextLog.etl.003 which were located in 
%SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\. 
Link file. %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\SpiderOak\SpiderOak.lnk was linked to spideroak.exe. 
Unallocated space. The spideroak word, the sync name, the sync folder name on the 
target machine, and downloading folder name were located in the unallocated space. 
Other files. We located information indicating the name of the downloading folder in 
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\GatherLogs\SystemIn
dex\SystemIndex.2.gthr and 
%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-
C647E37CA0D9}.1.ver0x0000000000000004.db. Downloading folder name was also 
  
seen in NTUSER.DAT, and ntuser.dat.LOG1. The latter was located in %UserProfile%. 
Several other files we located also contained the spideroak.exe word. 
3.4   Observations: Downloading from SpiderOak using the respective browsers 
We were able to collect information with forensic value associated with the 
downloading from SpiderOak using the respective browsers – see Tables 9 to 11. 
 
Table 9: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from SpiderOak using IE 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffic IP addresses 38.121.104.80, 80.157.17.91, and 
204.79.197.200 on port 80 and 38.121.104.79 on port 443 
Memory The username and the device name were visible in the URL 
(see Figure 9), shared title – the page was browsed -, and 
download folder name (SO Downloaded Files) 
Browser logs The URLs of SpiderOak that were visited along with the date 
and the UTC time of browsing, 
the downloading folder name and its path, the username stated 
in a URL, and the device name 
MFT and NTFS log The device name, the downloading folder name, the 
RoomKey, and the shared title (see Figure 10) 
Registry 
In addition to Typed URL, the following keys pointed to 
spideroak.com: 
 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\AppContainer\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet 
Explorer\DOMStorage\spideroak.com 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\AppContainer\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet 
Explorer\DOMStorage\spideroak.com 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-
3134846049-1001\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\AppContainer\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet 
Explorer\DOMStorage\spideroak.com 
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-
3134846049-1001_Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppC
ontainer\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet 
Explorer\DOMStorage\spideroak.com 
Paging The shared title 
Unallocated Space Contained the device name and the shared title 
Other files The shared title was seen in: 
 %SystemRoot%\WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-
twinui.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_6.3.9600.16384
  
_en-us_c34c6f62bd49d58b\twinui.dll.mui 
 %LocalAppData%\Packages\windows_ie_ac_001\AC\
INetCache\XSEVJ9WJ\shares[1].json 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\en-US\twinui.dll.mui 
Downloading folder name was observed in: 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend/$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi/LogFiles\BootCKCL.e
tl 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat 
and UsrClass.dat.LOG1 
 %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications
\Windows\GatherLogs\SystemIndex\SystemIndex.2.gt
hr 
Two files, one pointing to the downloading folder 
name and the other linked to the downloaded folder were 
found in %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\. 
 
 
Table 10: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from SpiderOak using Fx 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffic IP addresses 38.121.104.80 on port 80 and 38.121.104.79 on port 
443 
Memory The username and the device name in plaintext located in URL, 
and the shared title 
Browser logs Visited SpiderOak's URLs with the date and the UTC time were 
observed in cookies.sqlite; and places.sqlite located in 
%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\ 
(see Figures 10 and 11). 
The name of the downloaded file 
Both sessionstore.js and places.sqlite-wal were located in the same 
path contained the shared title and the username, and the shared 
title were located in several files in 
%LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random 
Name].default\cache2\entries\ and a file located in 
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\. 
The latter also included the username and the name of the 
downloaded file. The username was also found in 
%ProgramFiles%\Google\Update\1.3.25.5\goopdateres_is.dll. 
As depicted in Figure 12, in places.sqlite and the moz_annos 
table, the name of the downloaded file was observed. 
MFT spideroak.com and the downloaded filename were seen in $MFT 
NTFS log The name of the downloaded file was seen in $LogFile 
Link The only related link file observed was 
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\e_.lnk, which referred 
to an archive of all sample files downloaded from SpiderOak 
Unallocated 
space 
spideroak.com, the device name, username were visible in the 
URL, and the downloaded filename were located in the 
unallocated space. 
  
Other files The name of the downloaded file was observed in the below files: 
•
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.lo
g and WebCacheV01.dat 
• %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
• %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 
Table 11: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from SpiderOak using GC 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffic IP addresses 38.121.104.80 on port 80 and 38.121.104.79 on port 
443 
Memory The username and the device name were visible in the URL 
Browser logs History and Cookies files contained information about visited 
spideroak URLs with the date and the UTC time of browsing. In 
the History file, the name of the downloaded file and its 
associated device name were observed. History Provider Cache, 
Cookies-journal, Shortcuts, Top Sites, Top Sites-journal, 
Favicons, Favicons-journal, Preferences, Current Tabs, and 
Current Session were located in 
%LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default, which 
pointed to spideroak.com. The username and the device name 
were also observed in several files located in 
%LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache\. 
MFT and NTFS 
log 
"Spideroak.com" and the name of the downloaded file 
Unallocated space "spideroak" word 
Other files A file in 
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\ 
pointing to a URL containing the username in plaintext 
 
 
Figure 9. The username and the device name in the collected vmem file from VM-W16 
 
  
 
Figure 10. RoomKey and shared message in the MFT 
 
 
Figure 11. The username and the device name in the URLs 
 
 
Figure 12. The username and the device name in places.sqlite 
 
According to the recorded MD5 checksums, the contents of the downloaded 
files, with the exception of file13.dll, remained intact. We were not able to restore ADS 
from file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc such as Authors value remained the same as the 
original file. Unlike the result presented in Section 3.2, in addition to Created and 
  
Accessed fields, Modified value was also changed to the date and the time of 
downloading. 
3.5  Observations: Browsing and downloading from SpiderOak's iOS app 
As shown in Figure 13, a file named Cache.db-wal located in 
\Apps\SpiderOak\Library\Caches\com.spideroak.SpiderOak\nsurlcache contained 
valuable information regarding the registered account and created backups and syncs. 
 
Figure 13. Cache.db-wal containing some details of the account and created backups 
and syncs 
Downloaded files were located in \Apps\SpiderOak\tmp\.caches, and  
\Apps\SpiderOak\Library\Caches\com.spideroak.SpiderOak\nsurlcache\fsCachedData. 
The dates and the times of Modified fields were identical to the date and the 
time of loading into the smartphone.  
Apart from the file13.dll, the MD5 signatures of the sample files were the same 
as the original files. Modified date was pointing to the download time. 
4   Findings: JustCloud 
4.1   Observations: JustCloud's account created in using IE the respective 
browsers 
Recovered information associated with the creation of the JustCloud's account using the 
respective browsers are presented in Tables 12 to 14. 
Table 12: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the JustCloud's account 
using IE 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffic 
IP addresses 184.154.150.158, 37.252.162.208, 54.246.123.239, 
74.125.230.154, 104.219.49.71, 94.31.29.154, 82.178.158.19, 
74.125.230.132, 54.88.49.148, 217.163.21.35, 184.154.150.133, 
173.194.67.95, 94.31.29.237, 82.178.158.18, 74.125.230.153, 
23.251.138.168, and 10.10.34.34 on port 80. We also determined 
that some communications took place via IP address 
184.154.150.158 on port 443. The email address used for creating 
the account was found in a packet with 184.154.150.158:80 
destination. 
Memory The "justcloud" word, the email address and the name of the created 
  
account 
Browser 
related files 
The JustCloud URLs visited, along with the date and the UTC time 
of browsing were found in WebCacheV01.dat. 
The full name and the email address of the created account along 
with "justcloud" word in %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\Recovery\Last Active\{056F2E5F-67E5-11E4-9717-
000C29B56A39}.dat and 
%LocalAppData%\Packages\windows_ie_ac_001\AC\INetCache\X
SEVJ9WJ\account[1].htm. 
Registry The URL of the visited webpages and the date and the UTC time of 
browsing respectively in TypedURLs and TypedURLsTime keys. 
Unallocated 
space 
The name and the email address of the created account 
 
Table 13: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the JustCloud's account 
using Fx 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffics 
IP addresses 184.154.150.158, 37.252.170.92, 54.75.236.238, 
74.125.230.154, 94.31.29.154, 92.122.210.114, 74.125.136.95, 
64.233.167.139, 54.164.48.8, 217.163.21.35, 104.219.49.71, 
94.31.29.237, 74.125.230.141, 23.251.136.174, 184.154.150.133, 
and 10.10.34.34 on port 80. We also determined that some 
communications took place via IP address 184.154.150.158 on port 
443. The email address used for creating the account was found in a 
packet with 184.154.150.158:80 destination. 
Memory The "justcloud" word and the email address of the created account 
were observed in the collected vmem file. 
Browser 
related files 
In %LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random 
Name].default\cache2\entries, the following files were indicating 
justcloud.com was browsed: 
 09ACE8E5F96EFE3AA5A0CE0B5A5563299A0FDA44 
 1810CD15A41C6F610D8C7E8C4D39CDACB00E337A 
 1BDE5F2D8D9F11EF0F335C5A9128DBE71382DA75 
 380C3CF91DFA451FBF740CA76A7DCB2BDBC0889C 
 3E077C83363C5F69ACAEACB5C1994E04464AC18F 
 446FF2398AF1F92765363BD3327D6D8CA4F77EC3 
 461025C8C3F848EBC71F9E28B9120ABF00A1E074 
 54872F69BC90AE690242ED63D0318EDA90D3557C 
 553B5944009C5918AF6AF5A09812A8B0D17E6FBF 
 5AF6B030BB839756C1D72CDB22A272BF2A618C22 
 6457C1BCEB28A521EE0ACC12400A002A8C1D1A8A 
 7280D1006F4EA8E782FF4988DDACC2FE45E223CE 
 7B44045EC0465D6CCFCB9E9FB691424E2E970466 
 7F74C3A115A0B08422A8409FC7494E00E9090F75 
 9252811649D77766E4FB7DC750D825FE68E4CF10 
 93B403780DF9FED67C2E7AE5EC879780BFAF41C1 
 A721B51969F936D4EBAA8E4C6E3F99F8B703241B 
 AE3FAB291B124D80634CA386411F72B43E1B300D 
 C0EE83175D8130C265E78027748B480ABA944418 
  
 C83034755D57A645F6FF927E13522DCA8EC5E39A 
 CDC7FBBA3E3BA42AFF33CD41F35C9EB8D63C0497 
 CF49CBF7AD56117C73D75F827975BA8D9CFDF67B 
 D03FD20E97FDEE10EE8D20A4096B467ADB0B75B2 
 E84B0DEA1E343D9D0C39D74D7D8AED548046BD3C 
 F0016B4F7C6CB097EA6FB493CB9F3070AA8ABA37 
 F588D60C1323FF25E996F26CD45405D82D11C36E 
 F741938599B126A67F07C77106C86175D4F2DDBE 
 FC83C509516A560D495BCDD9C0C0025E0BB16907 
Information regarding cookies and histories were found in 
cookies.sqlite, places.sqlite, and permissions.sqlite. The date and 
the UTC time of visiting were retrieved from the two first files. 
Unallocated 
space 
The full name and the email address of the created account 
 
Table 14: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the JustCloud's account 
using GC 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffics 
IP addresses 184.154.150.158, 192.168.74.139, 68.67.128.156, 
173.194.112.77, 54.246.114.22, 104.219.49.71, 217.163.21.34, 
94.31.29.154, 74.125.136.95, 208.71.121.1, 195.59.150.17, 
173.194.112.68, 107.21.26.11, 94.31.29.237, 23.251.128.113, 
207.46.194.10, 204.79.197.200, 184.154.150.133, and 10.10.34.34 
on port 80. It was also determined that communications also took 
place via IP address 184.154.150.158 on port 443. 
Memory The "justcloud" word and the email address, the name, and the 
password of the created account 
Browser files. History and Cookies files contained information about visited 
JustCloud's URLs with the date and the UTC time of browsing. 
Shortcuts, Top Sites, Favicons, Current Tabs, and Current Session 
all located in %LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default 
also pointed to justcloud.com. 
4.2   Observations: JustCloud's Application Program 
Network traffics. Communications between the client application and JustCloud's 
servers were made with IP addresses 54.231.64.4 and 184.154.150.133 on port 80. 
Memory. The installation filename and its storing path, the name and the email address 
of the created account, the date and the time of account creation were observed in the 
memory. 
  
 
Figure 14. The name of the registered account along with account creation date and time 
in vmem file of VM-W11 
 
Client application files. In %ProgramFiles%\JustCloud\Database, the following files of 
forensic interest were identified: 
 mpcb_settings.db contained the email address and the computer name used to 
log in. 
 mpcb_backup_conf.db included the name of the files that were browsed to be 
backed up. 
Also in %ProgramFiles%\JustCloud\log, the below key files were found: 
 BACKUP.log contained a history of created backups along with the date and the 
time. 
 LICENCE.log included the number of days that the account had been created 
and the name of the account.  
 APPLICATION.log contained the date and the time of executing the program. 
 DOWNLOADER.log included the details of a download failure occurred during 
downloading sample files. 
 ONLINE_FOLDER.log contained the names of downloaded files. 
MFT, Pagefile.sys, and unallocated. These contained the installation filename and 
JustCloud.exe. 
NTFS log. The installation filename and JustCloud.exe were observed in $LogFile. 
Prefetch folder. CONSENT.EXE-65F6206D.pf, JUSTCLOUD_SETUP.EXE-
3C2F187F.pf, AgRobust.db, JUSTCLOUD.EXE-A4042D73.pf, RUNDLL32.EXE-
125D4518.pf, and TASKENG.EXE-5BAF290C.pf located in %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\ 
included either the installation filename or JustCloud.exe. Layout.ini in the same path 
contained both mentioned files. 
Windows events. An event regarding JustCloud's backup service was located in the 
System log. 
Link Files. Four relevant lnk files were found: 
  
 %AppData%\Microsoft/Windows/Start 
Menu/Programs/JustCloud/JustCloud.lnk 
 %AppData%\Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/JustCloud.lnk 
 %UserProfile%\Desktop\JustCloud.lnk 
 %UserProfile%\Desktop\Sync Folder.lnk 
Thumbcache files. JustCloud's icon was located in the thumbcache files. 
Other files. A task named LaunchApp was created in %SystemRoot%\System32\Tasks\ 
and scheduled to run JustCloud.exe /windowlaunch command. We observed the 
installation filename in the following files: 
 %LocalAppData%\IconCache.db 
 %ProgramFiles%\JustCloud\spf.dat 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve and Amcache.hve.LOG1 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SYSTEM 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SYSTEM, SYSTEM.LOG1, and 
SYSTEM.LOG2 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRU.log and SRUDB.dat 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\BootCKCL.etl 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
The below files contained "JustCloud.exe": 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %LocalAppData%\IconCache.db 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{3DA71D5A-20CC-432F-
A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000c.db 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve and Amcache.hve.LOG1 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SOFTWARE 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE.LOG1, 
SOFTWARE.LOG2, SYSTEM, and SYSTEM.LOG1. 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\TxR\{b7bee95a-0b1a-11e3-93fc-
90b11c043665}.TxR.0.regtrans-ms 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRU.log, SRU00008.log, and SRUDB.dat 
From our experiments, we determined that JustCloud does not allow the 
uploading of files with an invalid extension and users attempting to do so will be 
presented with an error message – "Failed: The remote server returned an error: (403) 
Forbidden.". Recorded MD5 checksums showed that, the contents of sample files, with 
the exception of file13.dll, were preserved by this CSSP. Similar to the findings 
presented in Section 3.2, we were not able to restore ADS from file13.dll. Metadata of 
file12.doc were not altered. The values of Created, Modified, and Accessed fields were 
changed to the date and the time of downloading. 
4.3   Observations: Uninstalling JustCloud's Application Program 
Memory. With the exception of not able to locate the email address of the account, the 
investigation result of the vmem file was the same as Section 4.2. 
  
Client application files. Although the JustCloud folder was removed by the uninstalling 
process, they could be easily recovered using FTK Imager (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15. Deleted folders of JustCloud 
 
MFT and paging file. The installation filename and justcloud.exe were observed in 
MFT$ and pagefile.sys. 
NTFS log. The installation filename and justcloud.exe were observed in $LogFile. 
Registry. The following keys pointed to JustCloud.exe after uninstallation: 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UFH\
SHC 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\JustCloud_RAS
API32 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\JustCloud_RAS
MANCS 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UFH\SHC 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store 
Prefetch. In the Prefetch folder, CONSENT.EXE-65F6206D.pf, 
JUSTCLOUD_SETUP.EXE-3C2F187F.pf, and Layout.ini contained the installation 
filename. Also JustCloud.exe was included in AgRobust.db, BACKUPSTACK.EXE-
831F34B6.pf, Layout.ini, TASKENG.EXE-5BAF290C.pf, RUNDLL32.EXE-
125D4518.pf, and JUSTCLOUD.EXE-A4042D73.pf. 
Windows events. A record in %SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-
Windows-Diagnostics-Performance%4Operational.evtx pointed to justcloud.com. 
  
Unallocated. The installation filename and the name of the account, backed up 
filenames with their paths, justcloud.com, and justcloud.exe were located in the 
unallocated space. 
Other files. The scheduled task (LaunchApp) existed even after uninstallation. We 
observed the installation filename in the following files: 
 %LocalAppData%\IconCache.db 
 %ProgramFiles%\JustCloud\spf.dat 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SYSTEM 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SYSTEM and SYSTEM.LOG1 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat and SRUtmp.log 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\BootCKCL.etl 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
Also the below files were pointing to JustCloud.exe: 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-
172faa90485d}\{4d3b40fb-cace-4558-a9ad-cbd7532ac6e2}\snapshot.etl 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-172faa90485d}\S-
1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001_UserData.bin 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-
172faa90485d}\{fbde4aa3-f5b4-4dc2-8312-ae0f4e1228c8}\snapshot.etl 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-
172faa90485d}\{73b44f2d-609e-4476-8a08-9342afe75051}\snapshot.etl 
 %LocalAppData%\IconCache.db 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{3DA71D5A-20CC-432F-
A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000d.db and {3DA71D5A-
20CC-432F-A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000c.db 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT, ntuser.dat.LOG1, and ntuser.dat.LOG2 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve and Amcache.hve.LOG1 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SOFTWARE and SYSTEM 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\ SYSTEM, SYSTEM.LOG1, 
SOFTWARE.LOG1, SOFTWARE.LOG2 and SOFTWARE 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\TxR\{b7bee95a-0b1a-11e3-93fc-
90b11c043665}.TxR.0.regtrans-ms 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat and SRUtmp.log 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\BootCKCL.etl 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\StartupInfo\S-1-5-21-1335463704-
3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo2.xml, S-1-5-21-1335463704-
3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo5.xml, and S-1-5-21-1335463704-
3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo1.xml 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\ WdiContextLog.etl.001, 
WdiContextLog.etl.002, and WdiContextLog.etl.003 
4.4   Observations: Downloading from JustCloud using the respective browsers 
We were able to collect information with forensic value associated with the 
  
downloading from JustCloud using the respective browsers – see Tables 15 to 17. 
 
Table 15: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from JustCloud using IE 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffics As shown in Figure 16, for downloading, JustCloud transferred the 
user to http://capsa.storage.googleapis.com. Connections were 
made with IP addresses 23.67.70.64, 74.125.133.95, 
74.125.136.100, and 94.31.29.154 on port 80, 184.154.150.133 on 
port 443, and 184.154.150.158 on ports 80 and 443 
Memory The sync name, the name of the account, and the device name 
Registry TypedURL and TypedURLTime respectively recorded 
justcloud.com's URLs and the date and the UTC time of visiting 
Browser related 
files 
Visited JustCloud's URLs with the date and the time of browsing 
in WebCacheV01.data 
The downloading folder name and its path, the email address of 
the account in a URL, and the device name in json extension were 
seen in one of WebCacheV01.data 's tables 
The email address of the account in 
%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\Recovery\Active\{4924C995-702D-11E4-9719-
000C29B56A39}.dat. 
The name of the downloaded files in: 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE
\[Random Name]\with-others[1].htm (contained the device 
name as well) 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\ 
V01.log and WebCacheV01.dat 
 %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows 
Defender\Support\MpWppTracing-11202014-001654-
00000003-ffffffff.bin 
MFT "justcloud.com" word 
NTFS Log "justcloud.com" word and the name of the downloaded files 
Paging file The name of downloaded files and their saving paths 
Unallocated 
space 
Device name 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 16: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from JustCloud using Fx. 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffics IP addresses 74.125.133.95, 94.31.29.154, 173.194.45.170 and 
173.194.41.40 on port 80 and 184.154.150.133, and 
184.154.150.158 on port 443. We also determined connections 
also took place via IP address 184.154.150.158 on port 80. 
Memory The email address and the password of the account (see Figure 
17), the names of downloaded files and the storing path 
Browser related 
files 
The URLs of JustCloud with the date and the UTC time of visiting 
in cookies.sqlite and places.sqlite located in 
%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\. 
The name of downloaded files in WebCacheV01.dat and V01.log 
(see Figure 18). 
MFT and NTFS 
log 
The name of downloaded files 
Unallocated 
space 
The email address of the account and the name of downloaded 
files with the path of storing 
Other files The name of downloaded files in 
%SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J, 
%UserProfile%\ntuser.dat.LOG1 and NTUSER.DAT. 
justcloud.com in 
%ProgramFiles%\GUM5EFC.tmp\npGoogleUpdate3.dll 
 
Table 17: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from JustCloud using GC. 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network traffics IP addresses 74.125.136.95 and 173.194.41.35 on port 80 and 
184.154.150.133 and 184.154.150.158 on port 443. We also 
determined connections also took place via IP address 
184.154.150.158 on port 80. 
Memory The device name and the name of downloaded files with the path 
of storing 
Browser related 
files 
History and Cookies files contained information about visited 
JustCloud's URLs as well as the date and the UTC time of 
browsing. History Provider Cache, Cookies-journal, Shortcuts, 
Top Sites, Top Sites-journal, Favicons, Favicons-journal, 
Preferences, Current Tabs, Last Session, and Current Session all 
located in %LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default 
also pointed to justcloud.com. The name of the downloaded files 
were seen in %LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\Cache\data_1 
MFT, NTFS 
log, and paging 
file 
They contained the names of downloaded files 
Other files The name of downloaded files in 
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows 
Defender\Support\MpWppTracing-11202014-101334-00000003-
ffffffff.bin 
 
 
  
Respecting the integrity check, the same result as Section 3.4 was obtained. 
 
 
Figure 16. For downloading JustCloud used googleapis.com 
 
 
Figure 17. Email address and password in vmem file 
 
 
Figure 18. The name of the downloaded files and their storing paths 
4.5   Observations: Browsing and downloading from JustCloud's iOS app 
In \Apps\JustCloud\Documents, a file named syncfolder.index contained the 
name of the sync folder and its files. Files located in 
\Apps\JustCloud\Documents\datacache downloaded files with different names were 
  
observed. In \Apps\JustCloud\Library\Preferences, a file contained account's user's 
email was located.  
5   Finding: pCloud 
5.1   Observations: pCloud's account created in using IE the respective 
browsers 
We were able to recover various information associated with the creation of the 
pCloud's account using the respective browsers – see Tables 18 to 20. 
 
Table 18: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the pCloud's account using 
IE 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffic 
IP addresses 74.120.8.14 and 77.109.171.171 on port 80 and 
74.120.8.7, 74.120.8.144, and 74.120.8.13 on port 443 
Memory The email address and the password of the registered account 
Browser 
related files 
pCloud related addresses along with the date and the UTC time of 
browsing in WebCacheV01.dat 
"pcloud" word in some files of 
%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active\ 
and %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Last 
Active\ and in some subfolders of 
%LocalAppData%\Packages\windows_ie_ac_001\AC\INetCache\ 
and 
\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\79IBA23G\qsml[1].xml 
Registry The URL of the visited webpages and the date and the UTC time of 
browsing respectively in TypedURLs and TypedURLsTime 
The following keys were pointing to pCloud: 
• HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContain
er\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet Explorer\DOMStorage\ 
• HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContain
er\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet Explorer\DOMStorage\ 
• HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-
3134846049-1001\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContain
er\Storage\windows_ie_ac_001\Internet Explorer\DOMStorage\ 
Unallocated 
space 
"pcloud" word 
 
Table 19: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the pCloud's account using 
Fx 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffic 
IP addresses 74.120.8.14 on port 80 and 74.120.8.14, 74.120.8.6, 
74.120.8.144, and 74.120.8.13 on port 443 
Memory pcloud.com and the email address and the password of the 
registered account 
Browser Files with random names indicating that pcloud.com was visited 
  
related files were located in 
%LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random 
Name].default\cache2\entries  
Information associated with cookies and histories in cookies.sqlite 
and places.sqlite and the date and the UTC time of browsing 
identified from aforementioned files 
"pcloud" word in permissions.sqlite, sessionstore.js, and 
places.sqlite-wal located in 
%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\. 
The last two files also contained the email address. 
Unallocated 
space 
"pcloud" word and the email address of the created account 
 
Table 20: Recovered artefacts associated with the creation of the pCloud's account using 
GC. 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffic 
IP addresses 74.120.8.14 on port 80 and 74.120.8.14, 74.120.8.6, 
74.120.8.144, and 74.120.8.12 on port 443. 
Memory The email address and the password of the registered account (see 
Figure 19) 
Browser 
related files 
History and Cookies files contained information about the pCloud's 
URLs browsed with the date and the UTC time of browsing 
Shortcuts, Top Sites, Favicons, Current Tabs, History Provider 
Cache, Last Tabs and Current Session located in 
%LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\ pointed to 
pcloud.com. 
"pcloud" word and the email address discovered in 
%LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\Cache\data_1 
MFT, NTFS 
log, and 
unallocated 
space 
The "pcloud" word 
 
 
Figure 19. The email address and the password of the created pCloud account in VM-
W9's vmem file 
  
 
5.2   Observations: pCloud's Application Program 
Network traffics. Communications between the VM and JustCloud's servers were 
established with IP addresses 74.120.8.17, 74.120.8.25, 74.120.8.28, 74.120.8.71, 
74.120.8.74, 74.120.8.98, 74.120.8.139, 74.120.8.153, and 74.120.8.157 on port 443. 
Memory. The email address of the account, the email address of the person who was 
invited to have access to the shared URL, the message of the invitation, and the share 
title were observed in vmem file.  
Client application files. In %LocalAppData%\pCloud\data.db, information regarding 
the synced files were observed. The file was in SQLite format and contained 25 tables 
that described files properties and folder names of synced data. For instance, as depicted 
in Figure 20, the file table contained filenames and their creation and modification date 
and time in Unix-Numeric format. Also in the hashchecksum table, SHA1 hash values 
of synced files were recorded where their values matched with the original files' 
checksum. 
 
Figure 20. The file table that contains filenames and their creation and modification date 
and time 
By using Autopsy, the invited email and the invitation message were found in the same 
file. We also observed the invited email in data.db-wal located in the same path. 
Registry. pCloud's default storing folder path was located in 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\pCloud\AppPFolders and HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-
21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001\Software\pCloud\AppPFolders. 
Windows events. In the Application node, records confirming the restore point creation 
and pCloud installation were located. Additionally, in Microsoft-Windows-Shell-
Core%4Operational.evtx a record about pCloud was located. 
Link files. %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\pCloudSync\pCloud Drive.lnk pointed to pCloud's client application. 
Thumbacache files. pCloud.exe was seen in TileCacheLogo-814531_100.dat 
The Installation filename was observed in MFT$, $LogFile, pagefile.sys, 
Prefetch folder, the unallocated space, and below files: 
  
 %LocalAppData%\Temp\pCloud_Drive_20141116195829.log 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve, Amcache.hve.LOG1, and 
Amcache.hve.LOG2 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SYSTEM, SYSTEM.LOG2, SOFTWARE, 
and SOFTWARE.LOG2  
 %LocalAppData%\IconCache.db 
 %SystemDrive%\ProgramData\Package Cache\{8527342e-b5b5-4274-8f1c-
01a0320d3b7d}\state.rsm 
5.3   Observations: Uninstalling pCloud's Application Program 
Memory. Unlike the two other CSSPs studied, pCloud automatical signing in feature is 
opt-in (i.e. only when a user opts to do so). Hence, no relevant evidence was located in 
the vmem file. 
Client application files. Uninstall process did not remove 
%LocalAppData%\pCloud\data.db and, therefore, we were able to recover information 
mentioned in Section 5.2. 
MFT, NTFS log, paging file, unallocated space, and the below files contained 
references to pcloud.com: 
 %LocalAppData%\IconCache.db 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\appsFolder.itemdata-ms, 
appsFolder.itemdata-ms.bak, and appsFolder.itemdata-ms~RF16c076.TMP 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{3DA71D5A-20CC-432F-
A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000a.db and {3DA71D5A-20CC-
432F-A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000b.db. 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\TileCacheLogo-
814531_100.dat 
 %LocalAppData%\Temp\pCloud_Drive_20141116195829.log, 
pCloud_Drive_20141116195829_1_pCloud_Drive.msi.log, 
pCloud_Drive_20141117112055.log, and 
pCloud_Drive_20141117112055_0_pCloud_Drive.msi.log 
 %SystemDrive%\$OrphanFiles\16a88d.rbf and license.rtf 
 %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
 %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve, Amcache.hve.LOG1, and 
Amcache.hve.LOG2 
 %SystemRoot%\Installer\{5950DCB0-F15C-48E0-96D9-
F5948DA2A419}\pCloud.exe 
 %SystemRoot%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\lastalive0.dat 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SOFTWARE and SYSTEM 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE.LOG2, 
SYSTEM, SYSTEM.LOG1, and SYSTEM.LOG2 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-
172faa90485d}\{002d5213-d0d9-41a6-ae97-4c3b05d067f2}\snapshot.etl 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-
172faa90485d}\{4c28eec8-7733-4412-8c51-3088b62b54f0}\snapshot.etl 
  
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-
172faa90485d}\{f65e2d08-cfd5-4865-9d14-9b092616ddd1}\snapshot.etl 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\{86432a0b-3c7d-4ddf-a89c-172faa90485d}\S-
1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001_UserData.bin 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\BootCKCL.etl 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\StartupInfo\S-1-5-21-1335463704-
3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo2.xml and S-1-5-21-1335463704-
3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo3.xml 
 %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\WdiContextLog.etl.001, 
WdiContextLog.etl.002, and WdiContextLog.etl.003 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT, ntuser.dat.LOG1, and ntuser.dat.LOG2 
Registry. The following keys pointed to pCloud: 
 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{a0b73fac-351f-3948-9d8a-
1dad9d870193}\InprocServer32 
 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{a0b73fac-351f-3948-9d8a-
1dad9d870193}\InprocServer32\1.0.0.0 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UFH\
SHC 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\pCloud\AppPFolders 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{a0b73fac-351f-
3948-9d8a-1dad9d870193}\InprocServer32 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{a0b73fac-351f-
3948-9d8a-1dad9d870193}\InprocServer32\1.0.0.0 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\Installer\Folders 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UFH\SHC 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-
1001\Software\pCloud\AppPFolders 
Prefetch. pcloud.exe was seen in AgAppLaunch.db, AgRobust.db, Layout.ini, 
MSIEXEC.EXE-B5AFA339.pf, PCLOUD.EXE-42B26121.pf, and RUNDLL32.EXE-
125D4518.pf located in Prefetch folder. 
Windows events. Records regarding the uninstallation were located in the Application 
node. Also pcloud.exe was observed in Microsoft-Windows-Diagnosis-
Scripted%4Operational.evtx, Microsoft-Windows-Diagnostics-
Performance%4Operational.evtx, Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational.evtx, 
and Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security%4Firewall.evtx. 
5.4   Observations: Downloading from pCloud using the respective browsers 
We were able to collect information with forensic value associated with the 
  
downloading from SpiderOak using the respective browsers – see Tables 21 to 23. 
 
Table 21: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from pCloud using IE 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffics 
IP addresses 74.120.8.7, 74.120.8.12, 74.120.8.13, 74.120.8.14, 
74.120.8.15, 74.120.8.86, and 74.120.8.144 on port 443 and 
80.239.230.147 on 80. We also determined connections with 
cloudfront.net were established with IP addresses 54.230.14.77 and 
54.192.15.86 on port 443. 
Memory The email address of the account, the invited email address, and the 
name of the downloaded file and its storing path 
Registry In addition to TypedURL, the following keys were pointing to 
pcloud.com: 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\LowRegistry\DOMStorage\my.pcloud.com 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\LowRegistry\DOMStorage\pcloud.com 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\LowRegistry\DOMStorage\www.pcloud.com 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-
3134846049-1001\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\LowRegistry\DOMStorage\my.pcloud.com 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-
3134846049-1001\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\LowRegistry\DOMStorage\pcloud.com 
 HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-
3134846049-1001\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\LowRegistry\DOMStorage\www.pcloud.com 
 
Browser 
related files 
Visited pCloud's webpages with the date and the UTC time of 
browsing in WebCacheV01.data 
The email address of the invited person in 
%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\O0RJ133
M\listshares[1].json (see Figure 21).  
The email address of the account in the below files: 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\[Ra
ndom Name]\userinfo[1].json and userinfo[2].json 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Last 
Active\{3B7526CF-70B3-11E4-9719-000C29B56A39}.dat 
Browsed uploaded filenames in the following file with the date and the 
time of creation and modification: 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\[Ra
ndom Name]\listfolder[1].json 
Several js and json files located in the above path as well as the below 
files were pointing to pcloud.com: 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCookies\Low\ZY2
FBEQ8.txt 
 %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.log 
 %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 
  
MFT and 
the 
unallocated 
space 
The "pcloud.com" and the email address of the account with the date 
of registration (see Figure 22) 
 
Table 22: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from pCloud using Fx 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffics 
IP addresses 74.120.8.6, 74.120.8.7, 74.120.8.12, 74.120.8.15, 
74.120.8.86, and 74.120.8.144 on 443, and IP address 74.120.8.15 on 
port 80. We also determined that communications with cloudfront.net 
were established on IP addresses 54.230.26.16, 54.230.26.91, 
54.230.229.182, and 54.230.229.204 on port 443. 
Memory The name of the downloaded file along with its storing path, the email 
address of the account, account creation date and time, the shared 
folder, its recipient and access permissions, and the date and the time 
of sharing  (see Figure 23) 
Browser 
related files 
Visited pCloud's URLs with the date and the UTC time of browsing in 
cookies.sqlite and places.sqlite located in 
%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\ 
The name of the downloaded file in places.sqlite and its moz_annos 
table  
The email address of the account, the shared folder name, access 
permissions, and the recipient in some files located in 
%LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random 
Name].default\cache2\entries\[RandomFolderName]\ and 
%LocalAppData%Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random 
Name].default\cache2\trash14488\ 
MFT, 
NTFS log, 
and 
pagefile.sys 
pcloud.com and the name of the downloaded files and its saving path. 
Link files %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\archivedwl-740.lnk pointing 
to a downloaded archive that contained all sample files 
Unallocated 
space 
The email address of the account with the date of account registration, 
the names of downloaded files, the shared folder names, access 
permissions, and their recipients  
Other files The names of downloaded files in: 
• 
%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\6824f4
a902c78fbd.customDestinations-ms. 
• %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\ 
WebCacheV01.dat and V0100036.log 
• %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J 
• %UserProfile%\ NTUSER.DAT, ntuser.dat.LOG1, and 
ntuser.dat.LOG2 
• 
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\Gathe
rLogs\SystemIndex\SystemIndex.3.gthr 
Also pcloud.com was seen in two mum files located in 
%SystemDrive%\$OrphanFiles\. 
  
 
Table 23: Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from pCloud using GC 
Location Recovered artefacts 
Network 
traffics 
IP addresses 74.120.8.6, 74.120.8.7, 74.120.8.13, 74.120.8.14, 
74.120.8.15, 74.120.8.86, and 74.120.8.144 on 443 were identified as 
pCloud servers' IPs. Connections to 74.120.8.14 were made on port 80, 
and communications established with cloudfront.net took place via IP 
addresses 54.230.26.21 and 54.230.26.96 on port 443. 
Memory The name of the downloaded file and its storing path, the email address 
of the account, the password of the account, the creation date and time 
of the account, the name of the shared folder, the recipient of the 
shared folder, permissions, and the date and the time of sharing 
Browser 
related files 
History and Cookies files contained information about visited pCloud's 
webpages with the date and the UTC time of browsing. 
The name of the downloaded file in History. 
History Provider Cache, Cookies-journal, Shortcuts, History-journal, 
Top Sites, Top Sites-journal, Favicons, Favicons-journal, Preferences, 
Current Tabs, and Current Session, all located in 
%LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default were pointing to 
pcloud.com. 
The email address of the account and the invited email addresses in 
%LocalAppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\Cache\data_1 
MFT and 
NTFS log 
The name of the downloaded file. 
Other files The name of the downloaded file in $Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J. 
 
 
We determined that the MD5 checksum of sample files, except file13.dll, were 
not altered after downloading. However, we were not able to restore ADS from 
file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc such as Authors value remained the same as the 
original file. It was also observed that Modified value of downloaded files was the date 
of uploading. The values of Created and Accessed fields were, on the other hand, 
changed to the date and the time of downloading. 
 
 
Figure 21. The invited email address in a json file 
 
  
 
Figure 22. Account email with the date of registration 
 
 
Figure 23. The email address of the account with the date of registration 
5.5   Observations: Browsing and downloading from pCloud's iOS app 
A file named p.db located in \Apps\pCloud\Library\Application Support contained table 
and data similar to those discussed in Section 5.2. We located file12.doc as one of the 
files opened in the pCloud app in 
\App\pCloud\Library\Caches\com.pcloud.pcloud.cache. Although the name of the 
located file was different, the MD5 signature indicated that the contents of the file had 
not been changed. The metadata of the file was identical to the original one. The only 
other sample file found in the pCloud's app folder was file1.jpg, but had a different 
name and MD5 hash. Due to the lack of collected data, we were not able to draw a 
conclusion regarding the integrity verification in pCloud's mobile application. 
6   Conclusion and Future Work 
In this research, we located and described various artefacts of forensic when SpiderOak, 
JustCloud, and pCloud were used with IE, Fx, and GC browsers, client application, and 
mobile application on Windows machines and iOS devices. The recovered artefacts 
include email addresses, the ID, and the name of the created account and the name of 
  
the uploaded and downloaded files. Our findings also suggested that user's credentials 
could be recovered from memory, and the checksums of sample files after being 
downloading from investigated CSSPs remained identical to the original. However, we 
noted that none of the investigated CSSPs could prevent the timestamp and the alternate 
data streams (ADS) of files from being changed. Our findings also indicated that 
metadata of the doc file examined in this study was not altered which could be another 
piece of useful information in forensic investigation. 
Future work would extending our work to examining machines running Linux 
and other less popular operation systems. 
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